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What we ultimately owe Iraq is to let the Iraqis grasp nationhood and sovereignty for 
themselves—and keep it, if they can. 
Noah Feldman 
 
In the vacuum left by the toppling of Saddam, the mosque was one of the few remaining threads of 
the social fabric that survived.  
Paul McGeough 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the attacks upon Washington and New York in September 2001 
(9/11), one of the central challenges posed to policy development is how secular and 
religious actors might together conceive a cohesive polity, or more poignantly, how the 
secular assumption of analysts and commentators might be challenged and corrected by 
the inclusion of religious actors and perspectives (Philpott 2002, Thomas 2005). In a 
context like occupied Iraq, itself a direct consequence of 9/11, where religious traditions 
constitute a primary structure of cultural and political power, the need to find some sort 
of secular-religious balance becomes acute. It is within the context of this debate that the 
award-winning Australian journalist Paul McGeough published an important analysis 
titled Mission Impossible: The Sheikhs, the US and the Future of Iraq (2004a). The 
present article critically reviews McGeough’s essay within the broader discussion of 
secular-religious relations in international affairs.  
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The thesis of Mission Impossible can be summarised around two ideas: that the US 
strategy in Iraq was flawed because it wilfully bypassed the traditional power structures 
of Iraqi society; and that these structures, formed around the tribe and the mosque, are 
anti-democratic, thus rendering attempts at democratisation in Iraq impossible. This 
article affirms McGeough’s argument concerning the gross inadequacy of the US 
strategy, but critically examines the author’s fatalism toward the democratic capacity of 
Iraqi structures, notably the structure of the mosque. Focusing on the Shi’ite community 
as central actors in an emerging Iraqi democracy, the article attempts to deconstruct the 
author’s secularist view that the world of the mosque exists in a ‘parallel universe’ to the 
liberal democratic West. By reframing the Shi’ites as essential actors in the democratic 
project, it situates political discourse in a ‘religio-secular world’ (Marty, 2003) thus 
bringing the ‘other’ worlds of religion and secularism together in a sphere of 
interdependence.  Such an approach takes us beyond McGeough’s orientalist posture 
toward the most prominent religious actors of Iraq, and emphasizes the importance of 
post-secular structures in the discourses on democratic change.  
 
 1. Mission Impossible by Paul McGeough 
From the opening sentence, Mission Impossible reflects the kind of as-it-happened 
intensity expected from one of the most highly regarded journalists in Iraq. Reporting 
from deep context and reliant on ‘Iraqi voices’ (2004a, iv), McGeough attempts to go 
beyond ‘narrow and partisan examinations’ (2004a, 8) of the occupation to analyse the 
conflict within the cultural traditions of the Middle East. In so doing, he sets out to 
describe a world that is radically unfamiliar to the Western cosmopolitan reader—
welcome to an ‘ethno-religious cauldron’ (2004a, 34), to the domain of the sheikhs. 
 
The world of the sheikhs 
Mission Impossible bores into the ‘bedrock’ (2004a, 8) of Iraqi culture, a conglomerate of 
tribal and Islamic traditions compacted together by ancient interests. The central actors 
between the tribe and the mosque are the sheikhs—‘men of power’ (2004a, iii), the true 
rulers of Iraq and of the region. For McGeough the sheikhs have effectively suffocated 
US neo-conservative hopes for a democratic Iraq in much the same way they unravelled 
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British plans for the region in the 1920s (2004a, 12). Significant for the present study, the 
domain of the sheikhs is described as ‘another world, a parallel universe’ (2004a, 4) to 
that of the West, held together by ‘tradition, religion and rites’ (2004a, 21) but not of 
democracy. On this latter point, McGeough is emphatic:  
 
The more I saw of the sheikhs, and the more I talked with them, the more clearly I realised that the 
most fundamental power structures in Iraqi society run counter to those which underpin 
democracy (2004a, iii).  
 
Understanding the world of the sheikhs thus requires ‘using your mind’s eye to erase the 
existing national boundaries’ and a return to when ‘what we now call the Middle East 
was carved up into warring tribal fiefdoms’ (2004a, 10). Tossing the American 
occupation into this ‘swirling mix of tribal and mosque power’ was unlikely to produce 
‘anything that Washington had in mind when it embarked on its project of regime 
change’ (2004a, 42). The title, Mission Impossible, is therefore chiselled as an epitaph on 
the tomb of the US-led campaign that has become bogged in Babylon.  
 
‘A pincers of its own making’ 
From a strategic perspective, McGeough portrays the US mission in Iraq as a ‘story of 
hubris’ (2004a, iv) gone wrong. This is in large part because ‘the neoconservative 
ideology of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz took no account of the 
people and the culture of Iraq’ (2004a, 7) who instead ‘believed they could build their 
democracy mall without planning approval’ (2004a, 7). More significantly, as with other 
moments of imperial over-stretch throughout history, in Iraq the coercive powers of the 
would-be conquerors seem no match for the cultural and historic arsenal of their would-
be subjects. It is not the barbarian hordes, nor the Russian winter, nor the Hindu Kush 
that proves insurmountable this time, but forces that McGeough attributes with a quasi-
metaphysical quality: ‘As the US focuses on its self-appointed task, around it, unseen, are 
the pillars of an ancient tribal society that, along with religious crossbeams of equal 
strength and proportions, are likely to doom the American quest.’ (McGeough, 2004a, 4)  
 
Indeed, the depth of mystery that animates the politics of tribe and mosque as reported by 
McGeough will challenge the most ardent positivist with the grim truth that ‘kids from 
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Texas and Idaho’ (2004a) beamed into ancient cities like Fallujah and holy cities like 
Najaf have next to no chance of winning the Iraqis to their imperial cause. As one 
‘youthful lieutenant’ exasperated, ‘What does a sheikh look like? I go to meetings with 
people who dress and look like sheikhs, but they don't carry a sheikh ID card.’ (2004a, 
65) As if to then divulge the futility of his mission, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey 
reasoned that until he can ‘figure [the sheikhs] out’ he will have to ‘stand above tribal 
politics and deal with the higher goals of safety, peace and prosperity’ (2004a, 65).  
 
By stark contrast, McGeough believes there is no higher goal than figuring the sheikhs 
out. The failure to do so, in both the planning and the execution of the occupation, 
explains why ‘the US is caught in a pincers of its own making, between the tribes and the 
mosque’ (2004a, 7) and reveals ‘why today's Iraq is not the nursery for democracy that 
Washington wants it to be’ (2004, iv).  
 
2. Toward a critical appraisal of Mission Impossible 
There is no doubt Mission Impossible is replete with incisive commentary, whether by 
McGeough as narrator or by Iraqi and other voices that speak into the narrative. As a 
grass-roots record of perspectives emanating from the many publics of occupied Iraq, it is 
an invaluable resource. However, fundamental questions also exist concerning the central 
logic of the essay. For instance, if the traditional structures of tribe and mosque cannot be 
utilised in building a democratic Iraq, what are the alternatives? What assumptions 
undergird McGeough’s view that these structures have an anti-democratic ontology? 
 
The problematic logic of fatalism 
One of the defining textures of Mission Impossible, explicit in the title, is a fatalism about 
the future of Iraq. Yet what holds this fatalism together are what seem to be irreconcilable 
tensions: on the one hand, it was ‘a very bad idea’ (McGeough 2004a, 8) for the US to 
exclude the sheikhs in building a new democratic Iraq; on the other hand, the political 
structures of the sheikhs run ‘counter to those which underpin democracy’ (McGeough 
2004, iii); on the one hand, McGeough trusts the judgement of Arab friends to lead him 
to study the sheikhs (2004a, iii); on the other hand, he does not trust the judgement of the 
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tribes and the mosque with Iraq’s future democratic affairs. Perhaps caught in a pincers of 
his own making, McGeough can only conclude that Iraq has become a ‘feuding, vengeful 
mess’ (2004a, 79) in a context where ‘there is no room for tolerance or trust’; and that the 
most powerful discourse in the country exists not between the Iraqis and the Americans, 
but between the Iraqis themselves ‘as they set the scene for a post-30 June carve-up of the 
country…and probably of each other’ (2004a, 80). These foreboding words mark the 
penultimate sentence of the essay, a statement of finality against which very few 
contrasting thoughts exist on tribe and mosque as political resources for a positive future. 
 
The fatalism embedded in McGeough’s argument is illogical, principally because it 
works against the central thesis of the essay, which is to criticise the neoconservative 
policy of bypassing the sheikhs. Billingsley summarises the US foreign policy goal in the 
Middle East as ‘wholesale political reform in the region based on the imposition of a 
liberal democracy—the one true source of progress’ (2004a, 23). McGeough powerfully 
testifies just how ill-conceived such an aspiration has proved to be. Yet at this point 
confusion arises: however foolish the original US plans for a liberal democratic Iraq 
might have been, Mission Impossible can be read as the defeat of liberal progress in Iraq 
because of the antidemocratic ontology of the tribe and mosque. In other words, 
McGeough knows whom ultimately to blame for the post-Saddam mess, and it’s not the 
Americans. Given the incompatibility of worlds involved—the liberal democratic West 
and the primordial domain of the sheikhs—one could argue that the invaders and 
occupiers had little choice but to foist their ‘liberal’ will upon the Iraqi people. Following 
the fatalistic logic of McGeough’s argument, the neoconservative strategy of violent 
occupation thus becomes strangely vindicated.  
 
Framing the analysis 
There is, of course, nothing wrong per se with bleak or despairing analysis. Some of the 
defining narratives of our time depend upon it. It would be ludicrous, for instance, to 
condemn Albert Camus’ The Plague for its bleak texture—how else does one allegorise 
the German occupation of France but through a story of unforgiving pestilence? Yet 
Camus, whose subject is more sinister than McGeough’s, wants also to tell us of human 
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capability in the face of life disasters [‘Ah, I understand sir. You're like me, you're a 
fatalist.’  Tarrou: ‘I had said nothing of the kind, and what's more, am not a fatalist. I told 
him so….’ (Camus 1948, 26)] McGeough, by contrast, seems fatalistically compelled 
toward a tragic ending. The phrase ‘the future of Iraq’ in the subtitle of Mission 
Impossible is thus rhetorical—there is none, or at least none worth feeling hopeful about.  
 
Is McGeough correct in his fatalistic analysis that the bedrock structures of Iraqi society 
are anti-democratic? I shall limit the consideration of this question to the relation between 
democracy and the deep cultural resource of religion. This is, of course, a large task that 
demands stringent control within the limited space of the present article. The two 
dominant Islamic traditions in Iraq, making up eighty per cent of the population, are the 
Shi’ite and Sunni. According to McGeough, while ‘the tribal structure appears to be 
stronger than religion in the lives of Iraqi Sunnis, the reverse is the case for the Shi’ites – 
for them the mosque is the dominant influence’ (2004a, 34). Whilst not disregarding the 
importance of the tribes, in keeping with McGeough’s framework I shall focus on the 
importance of mosque over tribe and offer an introductory analysis about the majority 
Shi’ite tradition in the region (Iran and Iraq) against the claim that it cannot be utilised as 
a resource for democracy. 
 
Before analysing the Shi’ites in relation to democracy, however, it is worth exploring the 
question of democracy in relation to religion more broadly. The rationale for this 
approach, as shall be argued below, is that McGeough’s fatalistic posture toward the 
Shi’ites in Mission Impossible stems from an a priori assumption about religion within 
the author’s own secular framework. As such, it is with a critique of this assumption in 
McGeough’s work and beyond that the present article is primarily concerned.  
 
3. Worlds apart? Reframing democracies in a religio-secular world  
In a recent article titled Worlds Apart, McGeough analysed the November riots in France 
by members of Muslim Middle Eastern and North African French communities thus: ‘It 
is too simplistic to say it’s all about religion and it’s too dangerous to lump it in with the 
global jihad.’ (2005) The essential problem behind the rioting is instead identified as a 
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‘freedom or democracy deficit’. Describing the Arab world as ‘a corner of hell where the 
privation of mind, body and soul leaves many youngsters in the homelands ripe of the 
jihadist picking’, for McGeough it is also an ‘irony’ that resistance to inequality and 
injustice in such a world comes from Islamic activists for whom ‘religion is a protective 
bubble from which to challenge the status quo’. 
 
It is noteworthy that in neither the analysis of the French context nor in the totalised sum 
of the Arab World is religion as religion given any political agency: explanations for 
Muslim discontent in France are purely materialist and structural; the prominence of 
Muslim activism on the moonscape of the Arab World is because there is no alternative. 
These perspectives are instructive in our attempt to identify McGeough’s assumptions 
toward religious actors in relation to democracy in Iraq. Whilst not discounting the truths 
contained in Worlds Apart, there is no ‘middle’ place for Islamic actors between the poles 
of anonymity and extremism. Yet so often it is in the middle political space, described by 
Martin Krygier as neither hot nor cold but ‘lukewarm’ (1997, 57), where the notions of 
pluralism, civility, freedom and democracy are conceived.  
 
For McGeough, and indeed many others before him, the middle space is by necessity a 
secular space. Religion does have its place within a secular framework, but according to 
prominent secular theorist Steve Bruce, only when religious interest groups ‘accept the 
privatization of their distinctive religious beliefs and move on to secular ground’ (2002, 
21) allowing democracy to be facilitated by a ‘neutral state’ (Bruce, 2002 16). 
Accordingly, secularization can be understood as the decline or containment of religion, 
both in society and in the minds of individuals, such that religious ideas and traditions no 
longer fundamentally shape the governance of a people (Bruce 2002, 1-45).  
 
But is democracy solely a derivative of the secular? For McGeough the answer is ‘yes’ 
and this influences his negative reading of the Shi’ites as anti-democratic actors in a 
desperate Iraq. One of the foundational assumptions behind Mission Impossible, what 
might be called a secularist assumption, is that democratic norms cannot, in any credible 
sense, function within ethno-religiously defined structures of power (e.g. 2004a, 79). For 
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instance, McGeough agrees with conservative analyst Patrick Basham’s lament that the 
current Iraqi middle class is unable to deliver ‘democratisation’, by which he means 
‘political debate in a secular, liberal fashion’ (2004a, 79). Iraq is instead a domain where 
religious actors thrive in an ‘ethno-religious cauldron’ (2004a, 34) of ‘prayers and death’ 
(2004a, 31), and where those exercising power from the mosque have no intention to do 
business in the meeting tents of democracy.  
 
What results from this approach is a denial of democratic alternatives to the one 
conceived by the secular liberal western tradition. For the author it seems near-impossible 
that such alternatives could ever evolve out of the primordial swamp of the mosque or the 
tribes: ‘any attempt to foist bottom-up principles of rights and democracy onto societies 
that are so top-down driven will require a decades-long commitment…. Or more likely, it 
will simply fail.’ (2004a, 77) In what is from many angles a highly contestable assertion, 
McGeough writes ‘In truth, except Israel, democracy does not exist in the Middle East, 
and this despite the sorrow of so much Western intervention in the region over the years.’ 
(2004a, 77) As if to warn against manipulating the cultural DNA of the Middle East for 
the designer interests of the West, Mission Impossible thus reads as an extended ‘I told 
you so’, a secularist condemnation of primordial power and those who try to coopt it for 
modern causes.  
 
Exploring democracy in a religio-secular space 
A contrasting response to questions about whether democracy is secular is to hold that 
whilst democracy can be secular in form, it need not always be so. Numerous scholars in 
the sociology of religion and international relations argue that there exists an observable 
desecularization of world politics (e.g. Berger 2004; Thomas 2005; Westerlund 1996). If 
this is true, non-secular structures of power demand consideration as constituent elements 
in the architecture of democracy.  
 
The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has recently argued that democracy isn’t a ‘western 
invention’ but is better understood as having ‘global roots’ (Sen 2003). Sen argues (after 
Rawls) for ‘a broader view of democracy in terms of public reasoning’ (2003, 29). The 
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inference drawn is that democracy ‘has demands that transcend the ballot box’ (2003, 29) 
and is better predicated upon the notions of ‘tolerance and openness of public discussion’ 
(2003, 31). As such, and in contrast to Rawls’ ‘thin’ notion of justice, this ‘thicker’ notion 
of democracy can be sourced in the history of cultures the world over. 
 
The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in the history of many 
societies. The long tradition of encouraging and protecting public debates on political, social, and 
cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and many parts of 
Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas. (Sen 2003, 29-30)   
 
It follows that a practical implementation of Sen’s conception of democracy would 
require the (re)inclusion of religious traditions in the building of democratic institutions, 
and a belief that these traditions can make a fundamental contribution to pluralism 
(Thomas 2000). Part of this process involves reframing the political space into what 
Marty usefully calls the ‘religio-secular world’ (2003) of international affairs. Marty’s 
attempt to find ‘a new model for describing the world that we actually inhabit’ (2003, 
42), like Sen’s call to reconceive democracy, acts as a salient criticism:  
 
The old debates revolve around binary categories: societies were either secular or religious; 
worldly or other-worldly; materialist or spiritual; favoring immanence or transcendence, etc...[but] 
most people blur, mesh, meld, and muddle together elements of both the secular and the religious, 
the worldly and the other-worldly. (Marty 2003, 42)  
 
We can employ this argument to credibly suggest that Mission Impossible is written 
within a binary framework where the reader is confronted with a war of the worlds—the 
domain of the sheikhs described as ‘another world, a parallel universe’ (2004a, 4) against 
that of the liberal democratic West. But is the West as ‘secular’ as Bruce and others 
suggest?  Might, in accordance with Marty’s more integrated framework, some ‘western’ 
as well as ‘eastern’ actors be better understood as religio-secular in outlook?  
 
One need not be a secularist in order to be secular or liberal. In Why I Am Not A 
Secularist Connolly argues that ‘secularism and liberalism are connected, though neither 
is entirely reducible to the other’ (1999, 10). Connolly then suggests that ‘secularism 
needs refashioning, not elimination’ (1999, 19), and—in what could function as a salient 
definition of a post-secular politics—argues that this refashioning requires a ‘reflective 
engagement…among a variety of religions and irreligions to support a more vibrant 
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public pluralism’ (1999, 6). For Connolly, the secular can be more ‘engaged’ with a ‘deep 
pluralism’ (see 1999, 137-187) than the secularist might suggest.  
 
If one need not be a secularist in order to be secular, neither does one need to be secular 
in order to be western. The political theorist Elshtain argues against what she perceives to 
be the ‘liberal monism’ of American politics thus:    
 
One enters political life as a citizen. But if one also has religious convictions, these convictions 
naturally will inform my judgements as a citizen. My religious views help to determine who I am, 
how I think, and what I care about. This is as it should be. In America it makes no sense to ask 
people to bracket what they care about most deeply when they debate issues that are properly 
political. (Elshtain 2003, 79) 
 
If this beyond-secular perspective can be argued in an American context, how much more 
so from cultural contexts fundamentally shaped by religious traditions as Iraq? Such a 
thought invites us to reframe what democracy is—what the constituent elements of it are, 
and from where these elements might be drawn.  
 
Religion America 
I have thus argued (after Sen) that democracy is not exceptional to the ‘West’, and 
suggested (after Connolly and Elshtain) that religion is not exceptional to the politics of 
the ‘East’. Relevant to the present discussion, one of the best examples of the 
complicated interaction between culture and religion in the ‘West’ is found in the United 
States itself. McGeough pits the secular West in a zero-sum fashion against the mosque. 
As a US-initiated and US-led occupation, it follows that the US is acting with secular 
intent. In some ways this is true. Whilst George W. Bush might at times present as a 
soldier for Christ, pivotal neocon strategists like Wolfowitz and Pearl, or administration 
heavyweights like Cheney and Rumsfeld, have no overt religious profile. Yet does this 
mean there is no religious agenda in a broader political sense?  
 
The effect of religion upon US policy cannot be measured by religious affiliation alone, 
but extends to understanding the scope and purpose of political power by those who seek 
to wield it. In what some understand to be a unipolar world of American hegemony, the 
US has become, as Mandelbaum puts it, the ‘hyperpower’ of world politics (2002, 61). In 
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celebrating this hyperpower America has experienced a religious conversion—to itself. 
‘The US is no longer just a nation’, writes George Monbiot, ‘it is now a religion…. The 
United States no longer needs to call upon God; it is God, and those who go abroad to 
spread the light do so in the name of a celestial domain. The presidency is turning into a 
priesthood.’ (2003) Monbiot’s thesis is not original, but it does contextualize a widely-
held view that at the foundations of US identity lie fundamentally religious concepts. 
This is, in many ways, not exceptional to the US, but conforms to what Anthony D. 
Smith calls ‘the sacred dimension of nationalism’ (Smith, 2000). What does seem 
unprecedented is the depth of missionary zeal produced when US nationalism is imbibed 
with hegemonic confidence.  
 
McGeough deftly conveys the religious nature of the US mission in Iraq when he 
describes it as ‘dreamy’ (2004a, 7). This incisive term offers insight into American 
motivations in Iraq. In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on the day before the 
shock and awe of US military omnipotence was unleashed, President Bush ‘dreamily’ 
acknowledged the immanence of the campaign as if it were a sovereign dispensation. 
Critically observed, this was a performance of soft revivalism, the preacher telling it like 
it is, not so much defending the faith as submitting to its presence—the manifest destiny 
of Religion America. Once hostilities had commenced, Bush lavished the US campaign 
with the ancient words of Isaiah 61: ‘to the captives come out, and to those in darkness be 
free’ (Monbiot 2003). In other words, the US is the harbinger of peace with justice, led by 
a President who presides over a binary world of good and evil (Singer 2004).  
 
The example of Religion America above is usefully negative. This is not because the 
religious energies within a nation have no positive potential, but because it neutralises 
any exceptionalist charge that Shi’ite error or excess in the Middle East is solely due to 
its religious moorings. Can the religious energies of a nation also be utilized in a 
constructive process of participatory democratisation? The religio-secular frame offers a 
useful heuristic tool for challenging notions of the mosque as always undemocratic and 
exploring post-secular democratic possibilities.  
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4. Toward a post-secular conception of Iraqi democracy 
In a strong critique of Mission Impossible, Anthony Bubalo argues ‘it is time we changed 
the paradigm for talking about democracy in the Middle East’ (2004a, 134) and, echoing 
Sen, states that ‘today democracy is not for the West to export or impose’ (Bubalo 2004a, 
134). Similarly, Stewart has appealed to the need for a new lexicon on Iraq: ‘The gap 
between the way foreigners talk about Iraq and the reality is monstrous. Our political 
vocabulary—“rogue states”, ”nation-building intervention”, ”WMD”, “neo-imperialism”,  
“terrorism”—is useless.’ (Stewart 2005, 9) Stewart’s main argument, contrasting the 
fatalistic logic of Mission Impossible, is that most if not all actors in Iraq ‘have almost no 
idea what Iraq is like or is going to be like’ (2005, 9). Stewart’s view serves to highlight 
how radically premature McGeough’s thesis of impossibility is, and it also encourages 
the exploration of alternatives to such a view.  
 
Tribe and mosque as sources of pluralism 
Bubalo sums McGeough’s argument as ‘culturalist’ (2004, 136) and rightly indicts 
Mission Impossible for depending on ‘caricature’. Caricature is marked by fixing and 
exaggerating certain qualities of a subject, and in so doing, ignoring the more complex 
and dynamic nature of real-life entities. By using immovable metaphors such as 
‘bedrock’, McGeough seems neglectful of the dynamic quality of the tribe and the 
mosque to adapt and contribute to an indigenous democratic polity. Yet on numerous 
occasions McGeough details aspects of these ‘bedrock’ structures that, if reframed, could 
be seen as possible sources for pluralism and diversity.  
 
For instance, with appeal to the tribal leadership of the sheikhs in Iraq, Bubalo argues that 
traditional structures of power are malleable and open to democratic process: 
 
Isn’t it possible to want strong leaders and at the same time to appreciate the ability to choose the 
strong leader you want?... The fact that sons and brothers are often passed over when it comes 
time to choose a new tribal leader underlines the extent to which fitness to rule and consensus are 
also important parts of [tribal] ethos. (Bubalo, 2004 136)   
 
Moreover, many of the tribes are religiously mixed, having members of the majority 
Shi’ite and minority Sunni communities within them. This diverse membership could 
form the foundation for inter-Islamic discourse on issues of security—the only possible 
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role McGeough can see for the tribes (2004a, 61-70)—conflict mediation and 
governance. Piggott has recently suggested that throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa the politics of the tribe will always prevail over religious affiliation (2005, 19). 
But this need not always be so, and the prospect of transforming contexts of internecine 
violence might depend on the agency of pluralism within the religious traditions and by a 
more explicit utilisation of religious resources such as sacred texts to deeply indigenise a 
post-secular democratic culture (Rees, 2004). 
 
Reframing Shi’ite politics 
A consideration of secularism above leads us to one of the defining tensions within 
Mission Impossible. Whilst the author forcefully describes what is so wrong with the US 
strategy of ‘crafting a secular administration that would be dominated by the hand-picked 
exiles Washington had airlifted into the country’ (McGeough 2004a, 7), working against 
his own thesis, McGeough’s secularism reinforces US concerns upon which this very 
strategy was based: ‘They feared that if liberated Iraqis were left to their own devices, the 
mullahs would demand an Iranian-style theocracy....’ (2004a, 7) A necessary focus of 
McGeough’s thinking about Iraq is the pivotal place of the majority Shi’ite community. 
The Sheikh of Sheikhs in Iraq is the Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. It is no 
exaggeration to suggest that the spectre of al-Sistani haunts Mission Impossible and its 
author. Indeed, such is McGeough’s fascination with the Grand Ayatollah, one could be 
forgiven for thinking the term ‘enigmatic’ was part of Sistani's official title. McGeough 
interprets al-Sistani with a nervous awe: awe at the pre-secular origins to his authority, 
and nerves at the autonomy that this provides. He writes,   
 
In the year since Bush landed his invasion force in Iraq, Najaf has reasserted itself as the spiritual 
heart of the country. The back-alley office of the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani has become a serious 
rival to Baghdad as a seat of political power. To this day the Grand Ayatollah remains an enigma. 
He has no political party and no army. He rarely speaks his mind and he hardly ever ventures from 
the ascetic home where he receives few guests—and certainly not Bush’s man in Iraq, Paul 
Bremmer. (2004a, 37) 
 
When does al-Sistani’s autonomy become subversion? What is the risk of including al-
Sistani in the circle of power, as his call for popular elections and criticisms of the interim 
constitution seem to indicate he expects? One word sums up McGeough’s concern: Iran.  
 
 
PORTAL vol. 3, no. 1 January 2006  13 
 
 
Rees  The Shi'ites, the West 
 
Even if al-Sistani compromises and accepts a US-sponsored framework for the future political 
development of Iraq…there are grave fears among secular Shiites and non-Shiite Iraqis that an al-
Sistani dominated regime might quickly evolve into something very different, perhaps something 
very theocratic, maybe something very Iranian. (2004a, 35)      
 
McGeough’s perspective is problematic. The sheer otherness of al-Sistani—described by 
McGeough as ‘a robed and bearded near-saint, a formidable opponent who says very 
little but means what he says’ (2004a, 34)—and of the Shi’ite tradition that he represents, 
produces in Mission Impossible a sloppy and prejudicial reading of Shi’ite politics that 
effectively shuts-out any place for the Shia in a democratic Iraq. Whilst acknowledging 
the political and theological diversity that exists in any religious community, given the 
Shi’ites comprise sixty per cent of the Iraqi population one can immediately see the 
impracticality of McGeough view.    
 
Of course, McGeough’s caricature of al-Sistani confronts the reader with another 
‘enigmatic’ Ayatollah, the leader of the Iranian revolution in 1978-79, Ruhollah 
Khomeini. Iran is often held up as proof that Islamic religious politics are retrograde, a 
point re-emphasised by the recent elections which were far more fixed than free. 
‘Theocracy’ has thus become an epithet for all that is wrong with political religion, 
particularly of an Islamic kind. When the Iranian revolution occurred its leaders were 
portrayed as ghosts from a past age, backwards in time and outlook, fundamentalists with 
little to offer the modern world. This was, and remains, the view of many opponents of 
Iran, none more so than the US. Iran has been the object of an unrelenting campaign by 
the US to paint it as an evil other, an aberration in world politics, whilst trumpeting the 
trustworthiness of ‘moderate Arab states like Saudi Arabia’ (Rice 2000, 60).  
 
This last statement was made in 2000 by Condeleeza Rice, now US Secretary of State. 
Rice holds the concept of a ‘moderate’ Saudi Arabia against a fixed and negative 
portrayal of Iran, describing the latter as trading in ‘fundamentalist Islam’ (Rice 2000, 
60). One can quickly see the illogic of such a view. Saudi Arabia is at best autocratic and, 
it should not go unnoticed, most of the 9/11 hijackers were middle-class Saudi nationals. 
More poignantly, one need only examine the Wahhabist tradition of the Saudis to place 
Shi’ite nationalism in comparative perspective. As the anthropologist Geertz puts it,  
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Wahhabism…is the name generally given to the radically puritanical version of Islam dominant to 
the point of absolutism in present-day Saudi Arabia—the sort that stones adulterers, decapitates 
apostates, forbids female-car driving, and, apparently, breeds such people as Osama bin Laden.’ 
(Geertz 2003, 37) 
 
By contrast, the closer one examines the politics of Iran the more one sees not the fixed 
fundamentalism of religious political control, but rather, a very dynamic process of 
political evolution within the interpretive tradition of Shi’ite Islam (Armstrong 2000).  
 
The fixed nature of the term ‘theocracy’ implies rigidity and a disengagement from 
contemporary culture. And, if the erroneous judgements and oppressive eccentricity of 
the Iranian regime were our only focus, there is plenty of rigidity to be found. However 
the Iranian revolution can also be reframed as ‘a multi-faceted revolutionary movement 
led by a religious opposition that appealed to widespread anti-Western and anti-tyrannical 
feelings’ (Keddie 2003, 24). Moreover, it was fundamentally shaped by the international 
climate of the Cold War period and was ‘neither east nor west’ in essence (Keddie and 
Gasiorowski, 1990). As with all post-secular political processes, which in this case is 
directly linked to the many post-colonial changes occurring in world politics in second 
half of the twentieth century, Shi’ite religion in Iran is highly complex. Complex, but not 
enigmatic. 
 
Diversity and evolution in Shi’ite politics 
I draw on two aspects of the Shi’ite revolution in Iran that challenge McGeough’s 
caricature of Shi’ite politics in Iraq. The first is a de-linkage: Shi’ite politics is diverse 
and cannot be neatly exported from Tehran to Baghdad. In his seminal history of the 
Arab peoples, Hourani argues that ‘the revolution could be explained in terms of factors 
specific to Iran’ (1991, 457). Hourani continues, ‘[In Iran] certain powerful classes were 
particularly responsive to appeals expressed in religious language, and there was a 
religious leadership which was able to act as a rallying point for all movements of 
opposition’, whereas in Iraq ‘where Shi’is formed a majority, their men of learning did 
not have the same intimate connection with the urban masses or the same influence on the 
government as in Iran.’ (Hourani 1991, 457-458) In other words, theories of a pan-Shi’ite 
‘theocratic’ polity must first deal with the Iranian-Iraqi diversities and not simply conflate 
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leaders and traditions across cultural, linguistic and historic divides simply because they 
share the same religious tradition. Notably, this generic regard for the Shi’ites parallels 
the neoconservative assumption that context and culture matter little in relation to 
democracy. It is therefore erroneous to invest the Shi’ites with a ‘civilisational’ unity that 
ignores the many clashes and/or differences that exist within the tradition. At times 
McGeough acknowledges this diversity, but only to develop the argument about violence 
and vested interest in Iraqi society. Headlining the fear that ‘the Shi’ites are coming!’ 
might make good copy for secularists in Iraq and elsewhere, but it is in defiance of the 
cultural complexity that is the very stuff of politics, whether ‘eastern or ‘western’.  
 
The second aspect is a linkage between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’ites. Against the thesis that 
the Iranian Shi’ites were ghosts from a past age, it is important to understand that 
Khomeini was not a traditionalist in Shi’ite religion but an innovator. His interpretive 
theory of Velayat-i-Faqih (Mandate of the Islamic Jurist) controversially called for 
Shi’ite involvement in government and was opposed by conservative Shi’ites. This was 
also different from the pan-Islamic polity implicit in the concept of umma where the faith 
community is not organised within the fences of any state. ‘In an Islamic context,’ writes 
religious scholar Armstrong, ‘Khomeini’s message was modern’ (2000, 2). Thus, as an 
innovative interpretive project, Iranian politics reflects an evolving process of post-secular 
political formation, first from secular to religio-secular autocracy, and now from religio-
secular autocracy to religio-secular democracy.   
 
This evolutionary process is reflected in the wider Islamic world (Hofmann 2004; 
Tamimi 2001; Abootalebi 1999). Scholars such as Frederic Volpi are also beginning to 
reframe Islamism as a potential form of pseudo-democracy alongside republican and 
liberal models (2004). Whatever obstacles one might acknowledge in Islamism’s march 
toward democracy, it is imperative that such an option be given central consideration. 
Volpi invokes Olivier Roy’s view that ‘the issue of the state in the Middle East cannot be 
properly addressed without reference to the loci of personal allegiances created by 
solidarity groups (asabiyya), networks and communities (particularly religious ones)’ 
(Volpi 2004, 1065). Such logic seems strengthened by McGeough’s own observation that 
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‘[i]n the vacuum left by the toppling of Saddam, the mosque was one of the few 
remaining threads of the social fabric that survived’ (McGeough 2004a).  
 
Volpi’s term ‘pseudo-democracy’ is somewhat confusing given that he favorably 
compares Islamic with liberal and republican democratic models. It is perhaps more 
useful to try and distinguish, as Feldman attempts to do (2003), between Islamist and 
Islamic democracy. This distinction is useful when analyzing Shi’ite politics in Iran.   
 
Iran and the possibility of post-secular democracy in Iraq 
That the Iranian evolution has stalled, and may possibly grind to a halt under new 
President Ahmedinejad, says very little about Shi’ite politics per se and more about the 
ability of autocrats to hang on to power. Such intransigence is not unique to Islamism, but 
can also be seen in the behaviour of republican and liberal democratic elites (Volpi 2004, 
1070-1074). It also suggests that the movement toward liberalisation by progressive 
Shi’ites under former President Khatami was not supported by a commensurate level of 
Presidential power over the military and security forces (Abdo and Lyons 2003, 121-
122).  
 
In a simple, if not simplistic, alternative analysis McGeough holds that in Iraq the 
‘Iranian’ alternative – meaning the Shi’ite alternative—is little more than the imposition 
of ‘theocracy’. By this epithet, McGeough conflates theocracy with autocracy, and turns 
al-Sistani and Khomeini into a single composite medieval figure not to be trusted with the 
future of Iraq. In a telling conversation with McGeough, Sheikh Mohammed Hussien al-
Kinana dismisses McGeough’s suggestion that many in the West saw Khomeini as an 
extremist. ‘That is only because people in the West don’t understand Khomeini.’ (2004, 
45) One need not be an apologist for Khomeini to see the truth of this statement. 
Understanding the possibility of a Shi’ite-led post-secular democracy in Iraq may require 
a reframing that goes back to Tehran.  
 
It is readily acknowledged that al-Sistani is no fan of aspects of the Iranian experiment. 
There are two ways one could interpret what ensues from this view. Either al-Sistani no 
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longer believes in Shi’ite governance, a view that cannot be reconciled with his public 
statements since the occupation and his patronage of the Shi’ite majority in the new 
elected parliament. Alternatively, al-Sistani is also an innovator and is consciously trying 
to develop the Shi’ite political alternative further. If Shi’ite politics can be reframed as 
evolving from autocracy to democracy, and if al-Sistani can influence Iraqi democracy 
and government in the same way he brokered a civil resolution to the siege of Najaf in 
August 2004, then history might well record how Iraq built the post-secular democracy 
that the Iranians never got.  
 
Numbers will of course help this process. The Shia comprise only 60 per cent of Iraqis, 
unlike 90 per cent in Iran, and will thus be forced into a national unity strategy with both 
Kurds and Sunnis. Beyond the process of coalition building, the acid tests of gender and 
minority rights must also be used to scrutinize the bona fides of any new government. 
These are the substantive issues of implementation, and it is readily acknowledged that 
there is long way to go in the process of democratic formation. There is nothing 
exceptionally ‘post-secular’ about any of this, yet these are the very possibilities that 
McGeough and others have suggested are impossible in Iraq because of the Iran-Shi’ite 
connection. 
 
Before any policy development can begin in earnest in Iraq, what is ultimately required is 
a change in the assumptions about Islam as a resource for democratisation. Beyond Iran 
and Iraq, scholars such as Keane argue that Islamism plays a vital role in bringing new 
visions of civil society into being. For instance, as a counter to the ‘compulsory 
secularism’ of the military autocracy in Turkey, Keane highlights the role of ‘Muslim 
actors intent on developing and redefining civil society—pushing toward a post-secular 
civil society, structured by new codes of ethics and aesthetics and held together and 
institutionally protected by new post-secularist government policies in such fields as law, 
education, municipal administration, banking and foreign affairs’ (Keane 1998, 28). For 
Keane, the concept of ‘global civil society’ marks an evolution toward a ‘new 
cosmology’ (2003, 1-39) that employs ‘religious civilisations’ as a catalyst because they 
have ‘developed world-views and world-girdling institutions that feed the streams of 
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social life that are today global’ (Keane 2003, 40). In a powerful recasting of 
‘civilisational’ rhetoric in the security discourses of scholars such as Huntington (1996), 
Islamic civilisation plays a central role in the search for post-secular civility and 
democratic participation (Keane 2003, 40-43).  
 
Specific to Iraq, Noah Feldman, a principal consultant in the design of the interim 
constitution of Iraq, argues for the prominence and necessity of Islamic traditions in a 
post-Saddam democratic era. He writes, 
 
Post-Saddam Iraq would pose an ideal opportunity for the world to show its openness to the 
possibility of Islamic democracy, by embracing any political parties or organisations that promise 
to work within the structures of democratic constitutional government. That would mean that ideas 
associated with Islam would figure in an Iraqi constitutional convention, and that Islamic 
democrats would be able to participate in a subsequent government…. A new government would 
have little chance of being legitimate if the Iraqi people were denied the opportunity to rely on the 
ideals and values of Islam to create it. (Feldman 2003, 180)    
 
Not only are we presented with Islam as a primary political resource, we are confronted 
with the creative imperative to include Islamic concepts (Hanafi 2002) in a democratic 
context that will not have it otherwise, such is the nature of democracy.  
 
5. Beyond Orientalism 
Bubalo describes the argument presented in Mission Impossible as one of ‘loving and 
loathing’ the Arabs (2004, 132). This is an understandable but overstated critique, and 
McGeough is justifiably defensive to the charge (McGeough 2004b, 140-141). I believe 
the entanglement of incisive commentary, astute description, yet also fatalism and 
blinkered secularist assumption that exists in Mission Impossible indicates a more 
complicated dynamic that is better described as Orientalist. Edward Said, perhaps the 
most authoritative voice on the subject, described Orientalism as ‘the corporate institution 
for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making sense about it, authorising views 
of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a 
Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient’ (Said 
1978, 1995, 3). In this essay I have criticized McGeough’s view that traditional Iraqi 
structures of tribe and mosque exist in a parallel universe to the so-called liberal 
democratic west. Whatever the author’s explicit intention, such an approach effectively 
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contains and controls Iraqi structures of power, negating their utility as political resources 
in the contemporary world. This is not done as an overt act of hostility, but rather, it is 
achieved through a critique of imperial power via ‘Iraqi voices’. Thus Mission Impossible 
at once limits traditional Iraqi power, advocates for Iraqi freedom, and dismisses Iraqi 
capacity to build a positive future.  
 
Said also asserted what many now take for granted, that ‘ideas, cultures and histories 
cannot seriously be understood or studied without their... configurations of power also 
being studied’ (1978, 1995, 5). This McGeough does by a commendably intimate 
investigation into the milieu of the sheikhs. However, Said also argues that ‘because of 
Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action’ (1978, 
1995, 3). Applied to the current discussion, Keane observes that many Islamists ‘insist 
that secularism …effectively functions as an Orientalist ideology that protects despotic 
states bent on stifling the growth of civil societies within the Muslim world’ (1998, 27-
28). Such an unfreedom is assured in Mission Impossible due, as the title forecasts, to the 
underlying fatalism toward the indigenous structures of Iraqi culture, and thus to 
McGeough’s Orientalist posture.  
 
That the views of an experienced western foreign correspondent can (still) be thoroughly 
deconstructed in the first five pages of a now classic text of cultural theory is more than a 
little discouraging. Reporting political change in the religio-secular space demands a new 
way of seeing and being in the emerging political forms of a religio-secular world. 
Whatever problems the authority structure of the mosque may have in its transition 
toward democracy, it seems absurd to suggest that it offers less preferable resources for 
Iraqi democracy than the just-as-traditional authoritarian violence that the ‘west’ has so 
often sponsored in the Middle East. Engagement with significant non-secular actors such 
as the Shi’ites to help concieve an Iraqi democracy is, by any measure, a necessary and 
worthwhile enterprise. Sen argues that ‘the value of public reasoning applies to reasoning 
about democracy itself.’ (2003, 34). As I have reasoned above, reframing the assumptions 
that underlie the descriptions in Paul McGeough’s Mission Impossible might help 
conceive a better democratic framework that includes the sheikhs, the ‘west’, and post-
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secular democratic possibility.  
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